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DEBT MANAGEMENT POLICY, INTEREST RATES, AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
bstract
The maturity structure of the U.S. government's outstanding debt
has undergone large changes over time, at least in part because of shifts
in the Treasury's debt management policy. During most of the post World
War II period, an emphasis on short-term issues rapidly reduced the debt's
average maturity. In the early 1960's and again since 1975, however, the
opposite policy just as rapidly lengthened (and is now lengthening) the
average maturity. Such changes in debt management policy in general affect
the structure of relative asset yields as well as nonfinancial economic
activity.
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that debt management
actions of a magnitude comparable to the recent changes in U.S. debt manage-
ment policy have sizeable effects both in the financial markets and more
broadly. In particular, a shift from long-term to short—term government
debt —thatis, a shift opposite to the Treasury's recent policy —lowers
yields on long—term assets, raises yields on short—term assets, and in the
short run stimulates output and spending. Moreover, the stimulus to spending
is disproportionately concentrated in fixed investment, so that debt management
actions shortening the maturity of the government debt not only increase
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At the end of World War II, the U.S. Treasury's outstanding debt
was mostly long—term: $54 billion of bonds maturing in ten years or more,
$66 billion of notes andbondsmaturing in one to ten years, andonly$47
billion of bills andothersecurities due in less than one year, amounting to
anoverallmeanmaturityof 116months.By contrast, in financing new
deficitsand refinancing maturing issues during the subsequent three and
half decades, the Treasury has usually relied on shorter—term borrowing,
therebysubstantially reducing the outstanding debts average term to maturity.
Thispattern of debtmanagement has no doubt resulted in part from the
statutorylimitations (occasionally relaxed) on issuing bonds bearing coupons
greater than41/4%, but tosomeextent it itasalsoreflected discretionary
Treasurypolicy.
During several specific episodes, however, the Treasury's management
ofits debt has taken the opposite tack (see Table 1) .onesuch episode
occurredduring the early 196Os, when anemphasison longer—term issues
extendedthe overall mean maturity from 53 months in January, 1960, to 69
months in June, 1965. Another is currently in progress. The mean maturity
of the Treasury's outstanding debt reached 28 months, its shortest post—war
level, in January, 1976. Since then reliance on regular medium-term note
issues and several new thirty—year bond has extended the mean maturity
to 47 months as of midyear 1981. Hence the result of the Treasurys debt

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as the average policyprevailingduring the prior thirty years shortened it.
Do changes in Treasury debt management affect the economy? Although
many economists assumed so in the first half of the post—war period, a series
of empirical investigations beginning in the l960s provided either weak
evidence for such effects or none at all. More recently, however, research-
ers using structural mOdels of interest rate determination (that is,
explicit supply and demand models) have provided partial—equilibrium
evidence of sufficiently imperfect asset substitutabilities in private-sector
portfolios to suggest substantial effects associated with major debt manage-
ment actions. Still, the effects of such actions on economic activity in
a general equilibrium context remain unexplored.
The object of this paper is to provide a quantitative assessment
of the economic effects of debt management policy. The principal research
tool employed here for this purpose is a hybrid model combining the familiar
MIT—Penn-SSRC (henceforth MPS) econometric model of the United States, a
structural model developed in Friedman [9,12] representing the determina-
tion of interest rates and financing volume in the U.S. corporate bond
market, and a structural model developed in Roley [27, 28] representing the
detenuination of interest rates in four separate maturity sub—markets of
the U.S. government securities market. The basis of the two interest rate
models is the requirement that, in each asset market, the amount of securities
demanded by investors must equal the amount supplied by borrowers —including
either private—sector borrowers or the government. Hence changes in the
pattern of government debt management can directly affect the market—
clearing structure of yields. The MPS model (minus its term—structure
equation, which is unnecessary in the presence of the structural interest
rate models), in turn develops the implications of these yield movements—3—
forother aspects of financial as well as nonfinancial economic activity.
Moreover, because the combined model is fully simultaneous, the general
equilibrium solution that it determines allows for a rich set of feedbacks
in both directions between financial and nonfinancial aspects of economic
behavior.
Section I reviews the underlying theory relating the structure of
asset yields generally, and the volumes of inside assets supplied and
demanded, to the supplies of outside assets. Section II describes the
combined MPS and structural interest rate model used for the empirical
analysis. Section III reports simulation experiments assessing the effects
of two different debt management actions —onea sustained change in the
patternof new financing, andthe other a larger change in the maturity
structureeffected withinone year. To anticipate, the results of these
experimentsindicate that such debt management actions, in plausible
magnitudes, would have significant effects not onlyonthestructureof
assetyieldsand prices but also on both the amount and the composition of
nonfinancial economic activity. Section IV briefly summarizes the papers
principal conclusions.—4—
I.Debt Management, Interest Rates, and Asset Prices
When asset markets are in equilibrium, the market—clearing structure
of yields depends in a straightforward way on the quantities of outside
assets supplied.
If investors' preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion,
and if their assessments of the returns on theavailableassets are normally
(or joint normally) distributed, in the absence of transactions Costs their
optimal single-period portfolio allocation will be of the form
=W(B + (1)
where AD is a vector of asset demands satisfying AD1 =W,W is total
portfolio wealth, re is a vector of means of the joint asset return distribu—
tion corresponding to AD, B and 'ii are respectively a matrix and a vector
of coefficients determined by the coefficient of relative risk aversion
and the variance—covariance matrix of the asset returndistribution,2
and t denotes the t-th time period. Because AD is proportional to W and
linear in re(1) is both the optimal allocation for a single investor
when W is that one investor's wealth and also the economy—wide optimal
allocation when W is aggregate wealth and all investors have identical
preferences and assessments. The economy—wide optimal allocation is still
of the form (1) even if investors exhibit heterogeneous preferences or
hold diverse assessments, and the aggregate B and T in this case are
combinations of the B and r appropriate for the underlying individuals,
weighted by their respective individual wealthtotals.3
The partial equilibrium of the asset markets isequivalentto the
market—clearingcondition—5—
(2)
S. where A is a vector of given net asset supplies including nonzero values
for all existing outside assets and zero values for all inside assets.





Forgiven wealth, and given preferences andvariance-covarianceassessments
(sothat B and it are fixed), variations in outside asset supplies clearly
affect the market-clearing structure of yields. The role of government
debt management policy in this context is, in the first instance, to
achieve just such effects.
For example, consider the case of a model with no inside assets
and only four outside assets: money (M), short-term government debt (5),
long—termgovernment debt (L), and capital (K). The structure of the
asset markets in this case is just the linear form
b bbaR, bre M/W5
S/W if b b b b r 5/W
s sm ss sR, sk 5
(4)
L/W ifbR, b b bzk r
L/W
Km b bk bkzbkkrk K/W
where, for covenience, both supplies and demands are divided by total
wealth defined as W =M+S+L+K,and the time subscript is suppressed.5
From the implications of the balance-sheet constraint (Em.=1;Eb.. =0,
all j), it is possible to simplify the system further by expressingit in
terms of only three coefficients in each column vector. Moreover,if the—6—
Jacobian is symmetric,6 it is possible to eliminate an additional six
coefficients. Applying the balance-sheet and symmetry constraints so as
to retain explicitly the six off-diagonal Jacobian coefficients indicating
the four assets respective pairwise substitutabilities yields
l-Tr -it-it -b-b -b b b b r
e
M/w S k ins m ink ins m ink m
it b -b-b-b b b r s/W s ms ms sZ sk s9., sk S () +
bm b _bmibs_bk b,k r, L/W
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Debt management actions in this simple model consist of offsetting changes
in the supplies of short- and long-term bonds which, at least to a first
approximation,7 leave total wealth fixed —inother words, dS =-dL.
What effect will such actions have on the resulting structure of
asset yields? The form of the asset demand system in (5), which explicitly
incorporates the balance—sheet constraint, makes clear that only three of
the four equations are independent, so that the system can determine only
three of the four asset yields. With rm fixed, for example, any three
equations of the system can determine r, r and rk. Moreover, although
the absolute levels of these three yields will depend on the coefficients
and on the fixed level of r, because of the system's linear form the
marginal effect of any dS =—dLon these three yields will depend only on
the Jacobian B —which, as (5) shows, can be expressed completely in terms
of the relevant asset substitutabilities. Solution of (5), for W, M, K and
r held fixed, yields these marginal effects as—7—
dr b(bfll(+bk+bk) +bbg,k
dS wA
dr b (b +b +b )+b b
insink sk £k sjcik (6)
as wA
dx b b -b b k—mZskmsk ds w•A
whereW is again total wealth, and A is the determinant of the subsystem of
the Jacobean in (5) formed by eliminating the first column (since r is
fixed) and any one row chosen arbitrarily.
Althoughthe derivatives in(6) remain unsigned in the absence of
any restrictions at all on B, the assumption that thefour assets are
grosssubstitutes8 —thatis, that each of the six off-diagonal b..
coefficients shown explicitly in (5) is negative —rendersthe determinant







ark >— < 0.
as
Hencea simultaneous sale of short—term bonds and purchaseof long—term
bonds increases the yield on the former and reduces that onthe latter,
while still leaving ambiguous the effect on the asset with supplyheld
constant. From (6) however, it is clear that a furtherintuitive assumption
about the ordering of relative substitutabilities amongasset pairs is—8—
sufficient to sign the effect onrk
also. If investors perceive an asset
hierarchy(in terms of safety, liquidity, etc.) extending in order from
money to short—term bonds to long—term bonds to capital,such that they
regard assets which are adjacent in this ordering asbetter substitutes
thanmore distantassets, then band b willbe large(in absolute
ms 2..k
value) in comparison to band b ,andthe effect of a debt management




Although the simple analysis in (1) -(7)setsforth thecentral
ideabehind the role of debt management policy in affecting asset yields,
two generalizations of this analysis are important for theeffects of
debt management more broadly as investigated in Section iiibelow.
First, although the general model in (1) —(3)in principle includes
inside assets, the model as written says nothing about the determination
of their respective quantities,andthe special case considered in (4) -
(7)excludes inside assets altogether. If all investors are identical, then
of course the outstanding amount ofeach inside asset must be exactly zero
ona gross basis as well as the net basis captured in the supply vectorAS
One investor would not borrow from or lend to another if both shared identi-
cal preferences, assessments and endowments. In a world in which preferences,
assessments and endowments may differ, however —andin which legal and
other institutional restrictions may importantly constrain the behavior of
asset market participants —borrowingandlendingamong individuals and
firms in fact constitute much of the financial markets' everyday activity.—9—




where h denotes the h-th investor (which may be an individual or an institu-




The special characteristic of an outside asset is thatA >0(if the
asset exists) and A. > 0 for all h,subject of courseto (9). By contrast,
the special characteristic of an inside asset is that A =0and <0,
again subject to (9).
While a fully aggregated asset market model can never identify the
gross quantity of an inside asset, a disaggregated model can do soif the
disaggregation is such as to distinguish positive from negative A.. By
far the most familiar such disaggregation in macroeconomic models is that
between the banking system and the nonbank public, which permitsidentifica-
tion of inside money; but other inside assets maybeworth identifying as
well. To the extent that gross quantities of inside assets matter in
addition to the associated yields, therefore —forexample, if the quantity
of mortgage credit borrowed andlentaffects homebuilding apart from the
mortgage rate, or if the level of household indebtednessaffects consumer
spending apart from the consumer credit rate, or if thevolume andpattern
of corporate financing affects business investment apart from therates on
bonds and bank loans —anadvantageof an appropriately disaggregated
model is its ability to identify and determine these quantities,thereby—10—
facilitating the representation of their effects on economic activity.
A second important shortcoming of the simplified analysis in (1) -
(7)is that it excludes induced asset price effects.9 Although it is
possible to imagine situations in which both the quantity and the price
of capital would remain fixed despite movements in the yield on capital,
a more plausible treatment would allow for a price response (say, in the
short run) or a quantity response (say, in the long run), or both. Under
the fixed-quantity variable—price conditions assinned by Tobifl [3 1,for






where K is now the fixed physical quantity of capital and q is its market




Because wealth now depends on the price of capital, which changes
whenever rk changes, the asset market equilibrium described by (10) is
richer than that in (4). A fall in rk as in (7') increases the supply of
capital. It therefore increases wealth and hence strictly increases the
sum of the demandsforall assets including capital itself. If
investors are wealth diversifiers (that is, ii. > 0 for all 1), then, under
the assumptions that give rise to the effects of a debt management action
on r and rL as in (7)andrk as in (7'), the consequenceof a flexible—11—
price of capital is a reduction in the absolute magnitude of each yield
effect without any change in sign. In a linearized version of (1), the
effect of dS =—dLon rk is
dr b b -b b
k— mZskmsZk
dS
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Thisexpression differs from the corresponding part of (6) only bythe
second (long) term in the denominator, which, like the determinant,is
unambiguouslypositive ifall assets are gross substitutes andif investors
are wealth diversifiers. Hencethe effect on rk is again negative, though




Althoughgeneralizing the model to allow for a flexible priceof
capital does not qualitatively change the effectof debt management on the
asset market partial equilibrium, like the generalizationto identify gross
quantities of inside asset stocks it may have importantimplications for
associated effects beyond the asset markets. Models relatingbusiness
investmentto the ratio of market price to replacement cost,either instead
ofor in addition to capital and other asset yields per Se,are wellknown.
In addition, because ownership of equity claimsto capital bulks large in—12—
household portfolios, and because the variation over time in equity prices
is much greater than that in other asset prices, the flexible price of
capital in fact accounts for most of the observed variation in household
wealth. To the extent that household wealth in turn affects consumption,
as is suggested by the life-cycle model, effects of debt management actions
on asset prices again may affect economic activity.
Finally, it is important to recognize that, once debt management
affects economic activity, with likely feedback effects on the asset markets,
any simple partial equilibrium analysis is no longer adequate. Changes in
incomes and spending may affect asset demands and the resulting market—
clearing yields directly, as in the presence of a transactions demand for
money, or through changes i.n borrowing that typically accompany certain
types of expenditures, or through changes in wealth due to induced saving
or dissaving. A model of general equilibrium, incorporating these and
otherinfluences in bith directions between the financial and nonfinancial
markets, is necessary.—13—
II.A Model of Interest Rates arid Economic Activity
Most empiricalmodels of interest rate determination that are familiar
today preclude analysis of debt management effects because they rule out
such effects at the outset. After first determining some key short-term
interest rate from the interaction of monetary policy and the demand for
money, most current models then proceed to determine the yield on anyother
asset, like the interest rate on long-term bonds or the dividend—price yield
on equities, from a single reduced—form term—structure equation estimated
directlywith the yield in question as the dependent variable. Equations
ofthis kind have become standard since the work of Modigliani and Sutch [22]
andModiglianiand Shiller [21].
Becausesuch term—structure equations in principle represent partial
reducedforms of some (usually unspecified) structure that mayresemble
(1) —(3)above.10there is noa priori reason why they cannot include one
ormore variables representing outside asset supplies. Indeed, in the mid
1960s several researchers attempted to isolate effects of the then recent
"Operation Twist"surrogatedebt management policy in justthisway. Although
a few analyses showed some evidence of effects on the yield structuredue
to changing asset supplies, most did not and therefore concluded that
Operation Twist had been a failure —perhaps not surprisinglysince, despite
the Federal Reserve Systems limited attempt to shorten the average maturity
of the privately held government debt via open market purchases, offsetting
Treasury financings led instead to a net lengthening(see again Table 1).h1
The finally estimated form of the "preferred habitat" model of Màdigliafli
andSutch,for example, in fact included no "preferred habitat" terms.
Subsequent work on interest rates within the single-equationdirectly
estimated reduced—form framework has largely followed the same path. Through—14—
most of the post World War IIperiod,either there was too little variation
(around trend) in the relative supplies of short— versus long—term outside
bonds, or investors regarded debts of different maturity as too closely sub-
stitutable, for the standard term—structure equation to detect any asset
supply effects. Analogous work based on more recent data has shownsome
evidence for such effects, but to date the extent of variation present in
the data apparently still precludes drawing sharp conclusions from such
imprecise methods •12
By contrast, structural models of interest rate determination constructed
explicitly in the form of (1) -(3)aboveprovidea way of extracting more
information from the available data,inthat the underlying market-clearing
structure constrains the way in which asset quantity variables enter the
analysis.Inthe most general terms, the structural model facilitates using
the theoryofportfolio behavior to restrict the model's implied equations
for relative interest rates, while imposing on the researcher the discipline
of acknowledging explicitly thatanyfactor hypothesized to affect relative
interest rates can do so only by affecting some investor's asset demands
(or someborrower'sasset supplies).13 The asset demand equations in models
of the U.S. corporate and government bond markets, constructed in this way
by Friedman [9 ,12]and Roley [27, 28], respectively, indicate that investors
(and private—sector borrowers) regard assets of different maturity as less
than perfect substitutes. Moreover, partial equilibrium simulations of
these models indicate that, because of this imperfect substitutability,
changes in asset supplies have sizeable effects on the structure of asset
yields.
For at least two reasons, however, it is useful to go beyond such
partial equilibrium analysis. First, debt—management effects within the asset—15—
markets only are of limited interest. What presumably matters for policy
purposes is the effects such actions have on nonfinancialeconomic activity.
Second, partial equilibrium analysis of the asset markets necessarilyholds
fixed all aspects of nonfinancial activity, including those aspects that
debt—management actions may affect. Allowing for the associated setof
feedbacks requires instead an analysis of the resulting general equilibrium.
The model employed here for this purpose consists of an alteredMPS
model (1978 version), from which the familiar single term-structure equation
determining the corporate bond yield has been removed and intowhich a struc-
turalmodel ofinterest rate determination in the corporate and government
bondmarketshas been substituted. The corporate bond yield is by far the
most important asset yield in the MPS model from the perspectiveof implications
for nonfinancial economic behavior. In the first instance,the corporate bond
yield exerts a major influence on business fixedinvestment in the model through
itsrolein determining the user cost of capital. It also exerts ananalogous
influence on residential investment at only one step removed;in this case
the relevant user cost depends on the mortgage yield,which in turn follows
from the corporate bond yield via a simpleterm—structure—like relationship.
In addition, thecorporate bond yield influences bothdurable and nondurable
consumerspending.The motivation underlying the determination of expenditures
on consumer durables is again analogous tothat for business and residential
investment, although in this case the model actually uses asimplified function
relating these expenditures directly to the corporatebond yield. The
primary determinant of nondurable consumptionis households' wealth, which
consists in large part ofequities;14 the model determines the market value—16-
of equities as the quotient of dividend payments, in turn determined by
a function in which the corporate bond yield is one direct argument among
several, andthedividend-price yield, which also follows from the corporate
bond yield via another simple term-structure-like relationship. Finally,
within the model's representation of the financial markets, the corporate
bond yield is a direct argument of the functions determining numerousother
yield and quantity variables that in turn also exercisediverse influences
on nonfinancialbehavior.15
The corporate bond market model consists of eight equationsrepresenting
the respective net purchases of corporate bonds by six categoriesof bond
investors (life insurance companies, other insurance companies,private
pension funds, state and local government retirementfunds, mutual savings
banks and households) and net sales of corporate bonds bytwo categories
of bond issuers (domestic nonfinancial business corporationsand finance
companies).16 The model's ninth, and final, equation is a market—Clearing
equilibrium condition analogous to (2), which requiresthe algebraic sum
of the net purchases arid sales by all categories ofbond investors and bond
issuers to sum to zero, and hence permits the modelto determine the corporate
bond yield as in (3)
Thegovernment bond market model has four parts,corresponding to
sub—markets for four separate maturity classes of U.S. Treasurysecurities.
These four maturity classes are defined in termsof four distinct ranges
(within 1 year, 2-4 years, 6—8 years and over12 years), with securities
in the three remaining indeterminate areasallocated to the respective
preceding and succeeding ranges accordingto a weighting scheme designed
to avoid anomalous effects that would otherwise occurwhen large individual
debt issues cross arbitrary classificationboundaries. The model for each—17—
maturity sub—market Consists of a set of demand equations representing the
respective net purchases of Treasury securities in that maturity class by
either nine or ten categories of investors (the six listed above as corporate
bond investors plus commercial banks, savings and loan associations, state
and local government general funds, and, for the two shorter maturity ranges
only, domestic nonfinancial business corporations).18 The supply of securities
in each maturity sub—market is exogenous to the model, and in each case a
market—clearing equilibrium condition analogous to (2) determines the associated
19
yield as in (3).
The specification of each investor group's respective demand for
either corporate bonds or any maturity class of government securities
combines the asset demand system (1) for given wealth, generalized
to allow for influences on desired portfolio allocations due to factors
other than expected yields (for example, expected price inflation), with an
optimal marginal adjustment model that represents in a tractable way the
effect of differential transactions costs which render the allocation of
new investable cash flows more sensitive to expected yields (and other
influences) than the re—allocation of existing holdings.20 The specification
of the two private borrower groups' respective supplies of corporate bonds
follows from an analogous treatment of the optimal choice of liabilities
to finance a given cumulated external deficit. For consistency with the
MPSmodel,all equations are estimated using quarterly data through 1976.
With the addition of the structural models of the corporate and
government bond markets, the altered MPS model iniludes anexplicitrepresen-
tation, as in(1) —(3)above, of the markets for six assets: money (orreserves,
depending on the representation of monetary policy), four maturity classes
of government securities, and corporate bonds.This system of six asset—18—
marketequilibrium conditions is sufficient to determine the yields on five
assets,given that of the sixth. With the yield on money (or reserves)
fixed at zero, therefore, the model determines the yields on the remaining
five assets that are interest—bearing in the conventional sense.21 The
yields on other assets that appear in the MPS model follow in the usual
way from the original model's term—structure—like equations linking each
to one of the five structurally determined yields. The Treasury bill rate,
for example, directly determines the commercial paper rate, while the corporate
bond rate directly determines the mortgage rate and the dividend-price yield.22
In all other respects, the model underlying the simulations reported
in Section III is identical to the familiar MPS model. Because of the richer
treatment of the determination of relative interest rates, however, the
altered model (unlike the original) admits analysis of the effects of debt
management policy.—19—
III.Empirical Assessment of the Effects of Debt Management Policies
Table 2 summarizes the results of simulations of the combined MI'S-
corporate-government-bond—marketmodel for two differentdebt management
actions: first, a sustained shift in Treasury financing to emphasize new
issues of short— instead of long—term securities and, second, a one—year
programto shorten the maturity structure of the outstanding Treasury debt
by issuing short- andrepurchasinglong-term securities.23 (The simulated
effects of debt management actions in the model are sufficiently symmetrical
that there is no need to show results of analogous actions to lengthen the
debt.) The simulation period in both cases is the ten-quarter interval
spanning1974:IV —1977:1.24
Ina partial equilibrium analysis of the asset markets like that
in Section I, specifying changes in policy-determined supplies of outside
assets (dS =—dL,for example) is straightforward. By contrast, in a general
equilibrium context both fiscal and monetary policy have direct implications
for the supply of government securities. For example, if a change in relative
asset yields due to a debt management action stimulates overall economic
activity, it will also raise tax revenues and reduce transfers, and, in the
absence of offsetting increases in government purchases, reduce the government
deficit (or increase the surplus). s time passes, therefore, the total
amount of government securities outstanding will be less than it would have
been otherwise, and it is necessary to make some ahistorical assumption about
the composition of Treasury financing. The simulations reported in Table 2
are based on the assumption that real government purchases are fixed and that,
in this situation, the induced reduction of debt in each maturity class is
proportional to the share of that class in the total Treasury debt outstanding;
that is, after the deliberate debt management policy action, the Treasury





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 (TPLE 2  continued) 
Variable  Symbols:  r 
=  3-month  Treasury bill yield  (%) 
r35  3-5—year Treasury security yield  (%) 
r68 
=  6—8-year  Treasury security yield  (%) 
rTL 
=  10-year-and-over  Treasury  security yield  (%)  r 
=  corporate bond  yield  (%) 
rDP 
=  dividend—price yield  (%) 
X  =  real  gross national product  (1972  $ billion) 
IP  =  real investment  in plant (1972  $ billion) 
IE  =  real investment in equipment  (1972  $ billion) 
IH  =  real residential investment (1972  $ billion) 
C  =  real  consumer expenditures (1972  $ billion) 
CUR  =  currency outside banks  ($ billion) 
RNB  =  nonborrowed reserves  ($ billion) 
DF  federal government deficit ($ billion) 
S  =  market  value of common stock ($ billion) 
PRO  =  corporate profits  ($ billion) —20—
change the maturity structure still further.25
Similarly, ifmonetarypolicy fixes the growth rate of either bank
reserves or any given monetary aggregate, the total amount of government
securities held by all private investors will decline over time as the
central bank conducts the open market operations needed to accommodate the
public'sgreater demand for currency associated with a greater level of economic
activity. If monetary policy fixes the growth rate of a monetaryaggregate,
then yet further induced changes in the central bank's holdings will also
follow as it accommodates the banking system's changing demand for nonborrowed
reserves due to the public's shifting preferences for different kinds of
deposits bearing different reserve requirements, as well as to any changes
in banks' aggregate net free reserve position. Hence some ahistorical
assumption about the composition of the central bank's portfolio is also
necessary. The simulations reported in Table 2 are based on the assumption
that the Federal Reserve System fixes the growth rate of the money stock (Ml),
that it buys or sells the amount of Treasury bills required to render
consistent the values of the Treasury bill rate determined in the money
market and in the shortest maturity sub—market of the government securities
market model, and that, for the incremental induced changes in the size of
its portfolio, it buys or sells the other three maturity classes of
government securities together in proportion to their respective total
amounts outstanding (so that in this respect it acts analogously to the
Treasury's financing of incremental induced deficits or surpluses).26
Apart from the assumed changes in debt management policy that are
their primary focus of attention, augmented by these additional technical
assumptions about the securities transactions associated with fiscal and
monetary policies, the simulations reported in Table 2 rely on historical
values of all exogenous variables. Moreover, each equation in the model isadjusted by adding back the historical single-equation residuals so that,
given the historical values for all exogenous variables (including supplies
of each maturity class of Treasury securities), the model would exactly
reproduce the historical values shown in column (1) of the table. The dif-
ferences between these historical values and the simulated values shown
inthe table s remaining columnsare therefore attributable entirely to
theeffectof the specified debt management actions, rather than to any
underlying inability of the model to reproduce the observed historical
record.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 summarize the results of a simulation
of the model in which, in each quarter, the Treasury issues $250 million
more short— and $250 million less long—term securities (before adjustment
for induced changes in the federal deficit). The historical amounts of short-
and long—term Treasury securities outstanding as of March 31, 1977, were
$144.5 billion and $20.1 billion, respectively, so that a change of this
magnitude in debt management, even cumulated over ten quarters, is small
in comparison with the former but substantial in comparison with the latter.
Because of the Treasurys policy shift to lengthening the debt after 1975,
in conjunction with the huge federal deficit in the wake of the 1973—75
recession, the historical amount
increased by $7.3 billion during
27
increase is only $4.5 billion.
means for selected financialand
showstherespective differences
historicalmeans shown in column
Thesimultated effect of
theTreasury yield curve, shown
—21—
of long-term Treasurysecurities outstanding
theseten quarters. In the simulation the
Column (2) shows ten-quarter simulated
nonfinancial variables, and column (3)
between these simulated means and the
(1)
this change in outside asset supplies on
in the first four lines of the table,—22—
corresponds to presumptions based on the theory of portfolio behavior and
interest rate determination outlined in Section I. The Treasury bill rate
rises and the long-term bond rate falls, in comparison to the historical
values, and the relative movements in the rates on the two intermediate
maturity classes lie between the twoextremes!8 Similarly, the effects
on private asset yields correspond to familiar notions of relative asset
substitutabilities. The average relative yield decline for corporate bonds
is only half that for long-term government bonds, while the relative decline
for the equity yield is smaller still.
The next five lines of the table indicate the effects of this debt
management action on both the amount and the composition of realeconomic
activity. Real output is greater than the historical by nearlyone-half
percent on average. Moreover, because of the sensitivity of investment to
cost—of—capitalfactors, fixed capital formation accounts for a disproportionate
amount of the increase. The three categories of fixed investment, which
togethercomprised only one—eighth of total spending, account for nearly
one—half of the simulated increase over the historical. Hence the results
support the suggestion that a shift away from the Treasury's recent debt
management policy would enhance the U.S. economy's rate of capitalformation.29
The bottom five lines of the table present values for additional
financial variablesthat are usefulfor understanding the structure of the
simulation.The induced effectson the Federal Reserve's portfolio are
small,given the assumption that itfixesthe Ml money stock, Small open
marketpurchases are necessary to accommodate the public'sincreased demand
for currency, but slightly larger open market sales are necessaryto
accommodate member banks' reduced demand for nonborrowed reservesdue to
smaller holdings of demand deposits and larger discount windowborrowings.30—23—
By contrast, the induced effects on the total amountofTreasury securities
outstandingare more subs tantiál. A large increase in tax revenues and a
small decline in transfer payments reduce the federal deficit and hence reduce
the required volume of Treasury financing.31 Finally, an apparent puzzle
in the simulation is that the increase in consumer spending is surprisingly
largein comparison to the small fall in the dividend-price yield, given the
underlyingMfl model's reliance on the life-cycle model of consumption. The
explanation, as shown in the table,is that equity prices do rise substantially,
in large part because of anincrease in corporate profits (which in turn
raisesdividends).
Figure 1 provides further information about these results by plotting
the historical (solid) and simulated (broken) paths, quarter by quarter for
all ten quarters, for six key variables. The increase in the Treasury bill
rate, in comparison to the historical, takes place gradually. By contrast,
the relative decline in the long—term Treasury bond rate occurs within two
quarters, while the relative decline in the corporate bond ratealso occurs
withintwo quarters but then almost disappears after another six. The
relative increase in equity prices reaches its peak after six quarters.
The stimulative effect of these financial developments on real output is
near its peak by the sixth quarter, but in fact continues to build through
the ninth quarter and then declines only trivially in the tenth. The stimula-
tive effect on real capital formation follows a roughly similar path, with
a peak in the eighth quarter and a negligible decline thereafter.
Columns(4) and(5) of the table summarize the results of a simulation
ofthe model in which, in each of the first four quarters, the Treasury
issues$1 billion more short—term securities and repurchases enough long—



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































relative to the historical (before adjustment for changes in the federal
deficit), For the remaining six quarters of the simulation, debt issues
followthe historical proportions. Such a one-year bill—bond swap program
would represent a major debt management operation, especially in the context
of the limited size of the long-term Treasury bond market. From$12.7
billion as of September 30, 1974, theoutstanding amountof long-term
Treasury securities in the simulation falls to $10.3 billion a yearlater,
in contrast to the historical rise to $14.5billion.32 Column (4) shows the
simulated ten—quarter means, and column (5) shows the respective differences
between these simulated means and the historical means in column(1).
The average effects of this one—year swap on the structure ofasset
yields are analogous to, but for each yield greater than,the average effects
of the sustained change in the maturity of new issues studied inthe first
simulation. Within the Treasury yield curve, once again the bill rate
rises and the long—term rate falls in comparison to the corresponding
historical levels. The rate for the second maturity class again movesin
the same direction as that for the first, and again by abouthalf as much,
while this time the rate for the third maturity class moves exactlyas much
as that for the fourth. The relative declines inthe corporate bond yield
and the dividend—price yield are of about the same proportion,when compared
to the relative decline in the long-term Treasury yield, asin the first
simulation.
The assodiated effects on real economic activity arealso similar,
though larger throughout. ieal output is greater byabout one percent on
average, with fixed capital formation againaccounting for nearly one-half
ofthe increase. The Federal Reserve's holdings of Treasurysecurities
declinemore substantially in comparison to the firstsimulation, almost—25—
entirely as a result of the reduced demand for nonborrowed reserves associated
with greater discount window borrowings,33 and the decline in the total
amount of Treasury securities outstanding is also more substantial as a
result of the stimulation of additional tax revenues. The combination
of a steeper relative decline in the dividend—price yield and a greater
rise in corporate profits (and hence dividends) leads to a much larger
rise in equity prices than in the earlier simulation.
Although comparison of the ten—quarter means shown in Table 2 suggests
that the economic effects of the one—year swap are just an enlarged mirror
of the effects of the sustained change in new issue design, the quarter—
by-quarter time paths plotted in Figure 1 (the dotted lines) make clear that
this is not so. The most immediate contrast is in the effects on the long—
term asset markets —includingthe long-term Treasury bond yield, the
corporate bond yield, and the price of equities. These effects in each
case build irregularly during the four quarters in which the debt manage-
ment action is in progress, but then decline rapidly thereafter and even
change sign during the latter part of the simulation.
The increase in real output in comparison to the historical reaches
a peak, equal to nearly two percent of the corresponding historical output,
in the sixth quarter. Thereafter it too erodes rapidly, so that by the
tenth quarter the respective output paths for the two simulations converge.
The peak effect on fixed investment also occurs in the sixth quarter, after
which the increase erodes especially rapidly because of the effects of high
short—term interest rates on residential construction (which falls below the
historical by the end of the simulation period).
The Treasury bill rate is the one variable for which the time path
resulting from the one—year swap most nearly resembles that from the sustained—26—
debt management change. The increase in the bill rate in comparison with
the historical continues to build almost until the end of the simulation
period, when the effect on real income has largely eroded.
The contrasts between these two simulations indicate that, in addition
to the magnitude, the timing of a debt management action affects its impact
on the economy. This result is not surprising in light of the basic model
of portfolio adjustment underlying both the corporate and the government
bond market models. Because the adjustment model distinguishes between
allocation of new cash flows and re-allocation of existing holdings
(and draws an analogous distinction between private borrowers' financing
of new external deficits and refinancing of existing liabilities), in the
short run financial flow variables matter in addition to stock variables.34
Hence the size of a debt management action in relation to other flows in the
financial system is a key determinant of its effects.
More importantly, however, despite their contrasts the two sets of
resultsboth indicate that debt management actions have effects, on interest
rates as well as nonfinancial economic activity, which notonly are in
accordancewith familiar theorybut also are of a size deserving attention.—27—
IV.Summary of Conclusions
The maturity structure of the U.S.government'soutstanding debt has
undergone large changes over time, at least in part because of shifts in the
Treasury's debt management policy. During most of the post World War II
period, an emphasis on short—term issues rapidly reduced the debt's average
maturity. In the early 1960s and again since 1975, however, the opposite
policy just as rapidly lengthened (and is now lengthening) the average maturity.
Debt management actions do not leave other aspects of economic activity
unaffected. In the financial markets changes in the relative supplies of
outside assets in general alter the structure of expected yields on all assets
whether outside or inside, raising the relative yield on the asset with supply
increased and on assets closely substitutable for it, and lowering the rela-
tive yield on the asset with supply decreased and on its close substitutes.
In a general equilibrium context the resulting realignment of asset yields
and prices also affects nonfinancial economic activity.
Simulation experiments indicate that debt management actions of a magni-
tude comparable to observed changes in U.S. debtmanagement policy have
sizeableeffects both in the financial markets and more broadly. In particular,
a shift from long- to short-termgovernment debt lowers yields on long-term
assets (and raises their prices), raises yields on short—term assets, and
in the short run stimulates output and spending. Moreover, the stimulus to
spending is disproportionately concentrated in fixedinvestment, sothat
debt management actions shortening the maturity of the government debt not
onlyincrease the economy's Output but also shift the composition of output
toward increased capital formation.Footnotes
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Mattione for research assistance; to them as well as James Duesenberry,
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and Edwin Yeo for helpful discussions and comments on an earlier draft;
and to the National Science Foundation (grant DAR79-l0519) and the Alfred
P. Sloan Foundation for research support. I am especially grateful to
Vance Roley for generous advice on the adaptation of his model for use
in this paper.
1. The distribution data in Table 1 slightly understate the shift to
shorter maturities because of the switch from a first—call classifica-
tion for 1945-55 to a final-maturity classification for 1960-80.
(Thefirst—call breakdown for 1960, corresponding to that shown in the
table, is 43.0%, 39.7%, 9.6%, 2.4%, 5.2%). The mean maturity computa-
tionisbased on final maturity and is consistent throughout.
2.The specific form of (1), if all assets are risky, is B =
— [Q
1
—l —l —l —l —l —l —l p
-(1] 1) Q 1 1 ] Iandii= (1] 1)Q 1, where p is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion and S is the variance—covariance
matrix. Here B is singular, so that the asset demand system will be
capable of determining all relative yields and all but one absolute
yield. Alternatively, in the presence of a risk-free (certain return)
asset the full Q matrix is singular, so that it is necessary to
partition the set of demands; the resulting asset demand system, in
which AID, re and Q refer to the risky assets only, is then just
D .e 1 —l A =w(Br)whereB = , andhe optimal portfolio demandfor
the risk-free asset is simply (w -A1). See Friedman and Roley [161
for a proof that constant relative risk aversion and joint normal
asset return assessments imply asset demand functions that are
homogeneous in wealth and linear in expected returns, and Roley [25]
for a thorough treatment of the distinction between the cases with
and without a risk—free asset.(The combination of constant relative
risk aversion and normal distributions is only an approximation, in
that the underlying utility function is undefined for negative wealth
values.)
3. See Linther [20] and Friedman [13] for explicit treatments of the case
of heterogeneous investors.
4. Because the full B matrix is singular (see again footnote 2), the
expression in (3) actually has dimension reduced by one and therefore
represents the determination of relative yields against an arbitrary
fixed benchmark in the case of all risky assets or against the certain
yield in the presence of a risk-free asset. Pn isomorphic interpreta-
tion of (3) is that relative asset returns depend on shares in the
market portfolio relative to shares in the minimum—variance portfolio.5. Including anadditionaltermtorepresent the dependence of the demand
for money(and hence at least one other asset) on income, in accordance
with standard transactions—inventory models, would not alter theanalysis here; see Friedman [lii.
6.See Roley [25] on the implications of a syxmnetric Jacobian.
7. The condition dS-dL holds exactly in a timeless abstraction in which,
with no prior history of assets outstanding, the government distributes
one kind of bond or the other, or both. In a more realistic context
however, wealth does change because of valuation changes on the out-
standing long—term bonds. For example, to anticipate the analysis
that follows, suppose that the government issues short—term bonds and
uses exactly the entire proceeds to buy back some of its outstanding
long—term bonds. If that action reduces the yield on the long-term
bonds still outstanding, the associated rise in these bonds' price will
raise total wealth. The reasoning is analogous to that argued below
for the case of valuation of capital. See Roley [26] for a theoretical
discussion emphasizing changes in bond prices resulting from debt manage-
ment actions.
8. See Blanchard and Plantes [2 ] for a statement of necessary and sufficient
conditions for gross substitutability. The covariance matrices reported
in Bodie [ 3 ] suggest that, for broad asset categories like those under
consideration here, at least the necessary conditions are met in practice.
9. See again foothote 7.
10. As Feldstein and Chamberlain [7] have pointed out, however, the presence
of the unlagged short-term interest rate as a supposedly independent
variable precludes most such equations from being valid reduced forms.
In this context see also Sargent's [29] criticism of the interest rate
equation suggested by Feldstein and Eckstein [8 1, as well as the
empirical evidence in Sargent [30].
11. The most comprehensive attempt to find evidence of such effects was
that of Modigliani and Sutch [231.. exampleof results exhibiting
such effects is in Okun [24], but Okun concluded that the effects were
small.
12. The term—structure equation estimated in Friedman [10], using Fair's [6
method and quarterly data for 1960:1 -1976:11,was
r =0.000546+ 0.902 r +0.265r




=0.97 SE =0.0234e =0.592where rz and r5 are the yields on Baa-rated corporate bonds and 3-
month Treasury bills, respectively, L and S are the outstanding amounts
of U.S. government securities maturing in more than and less than one
year, repectively, all variables are expressed in natural logarithms,
and the numbers in parentheses are t—statistics. Estimating the same
equation using data through l980:Iv gives essentially similar results
(including a coefficient of 0.0550, with t—statisttc 1.8, on the debt—
management term).
13. See Friedman and Roley [17] for a general discussion of the structural
and reduced—form approaches to modeling the determination of interest
rates.
14. What matters in this context is the contribution of equities not to the
level but rather to the variation of households' wealth. Given the
great volatility of equity prices in contrast with the fixed-price
nature of deposits, the typical 30% share of equities in households'
total wealth greatly understates the role of equities in accounting
for the variations of household wealth over time.
15. The most important element of financial quantity variables' effects on
nonfinancial behavior in the MPS model is the credit availability
effect in the mortgage market; see de Leeuw and Gramlich [5 1 and the
papers by Gramlich and Hulett, Modigliani, and Jaf fee in Gramlich and
Jaffee [18].
16. The model takes as exogenous the net bond purchases and sales of all
investors and issuers other than those noted above. The explicitly
modeled investors and issuers account for about 95% and 90%, respectively,
of all corporate bonds issued in the United States.
17. The particular bond rate used in this model is the observed new-issue
yield on long-term utility bonds rated Aa by Moody's Investor Service,
Inc. Pn additional equation then determines the Aaa seasoned corporate
yield, the bond rate used in the MPS model, as a simple direct function
of the Aa new—issue yield and the longest-term government yield.
Eliminating the Aaa seasoned yield altogether and using the Aa new-
issue yield in its place would require re—estimating each MPS model
equation in which the corporate bond rate appears.
18. The model takes as exogenous the net bond purchases of all investors
other than those noted above. The explicitly modeled investors account
for about 55% of all holdings of U.S. Treasury securities. The Federal
Reserve SyAtem (24%) and foreign investors (18%) account for most of
the remainder.
19. The particular yields corresponding to the four maturity ranges are
the Treasury yields on 3-month bills and bonds in the 3-5-year,
6—8—year, and 10-year—and—over groups.20. See Friedman [9 1forthe development of the optimal marginal adjust-
ment model used in all of the corporate bond demand andsupply equations
and most of the government security demand equations, andRoley [28]
for the development of a more general alternative used in some of the
government security demands (especially those for commercial banks).
21. If the estimation of the six sets of asset demand (and supply)equations
imposed the full set of balance sheet constraints for all investors
(and private—sector borrowers), solving the model would simply involve
deleting the equilibrium condition for any one market chosen arbitrarily.
Imposing these constraints, however, would have required also re—estimating
the MPS model's aggregate money demand equation. Infact, the constraints
are not fully imposed, and hence the model is overdetermined. In the
simulations reported in Section III below, the composition of the
Federal Reserve's portfolio is adjusted in each period so as to render
consistent the Treasury bill rate proximately determined in themoney
market and the Treasury bill rate proximately determined in the shortest
maturity sub—market of the government securities market model (see the
discussion in Section III). Analogous simulations, based on an alterna-
tive solution procedure in which the Treasury bill rate isproximately
determined in the government securities market model and the MPS model's
money demand equation is deleted, differ in some specifics but yield
the same overall results.
22. At least in principle, a fullycomprehensive structural model of all
asset markets would be preferable. For efforts along these lines see
Bosworth and Duesenberry [4], Rendershott [19] and Backus et al. [11;
n:one of these models, however, distinguishes between government and
corporate bonds and among maturity classes of government securities
as in the model used here.
23. Because the U.S. Treasury does not ordinarily repurchase its outstanding
long—term bonds, it is perhaps easiest to think of such a one—year
program as carried out by Federal Reserve open market operations.
24. Carrying Out the investigation under conditions of underutilized
resources in the economy is probably best because of familiar concerns
about the underlying MPS model's representation of economic behavior
near full employment. As is apparent from Figure 1 below, l974:IV
is the quarter immediately preceding the trough of the large 1973-75
recession. This period was also an interesting one in the context
of the historical debt management policy; see again Section I.
25. With government purchases fixed in real terms, there is some slight
offset to the increased tax revenues due to the rising price level.
This effect is small in a ten—quarter simulation, however, so that
most of the rise in revenues simply reduces the deficit. It is perhaps
useful to note explicitly that this way of treating the financing of the
induced reduction in government debt outstanding assumes, as in Tobin [31],
that the Treasury is not pursuing a policy of minimizing interest costs
(at least at this particular margin).26. See again foothote 21. Here, too, the assumption is that the Federal
Reserve does not act to maximize interest earnings on its portfolio.
27. The outstanding supply of long-term Treasury securities at the end of
the ten quarters in the simulation is lower than the historical by
$2.88 billion instead of $2.50 billion (10 quarters times $250 million
perquarter) because of the smaller total volume of Treasury financing
due to the induced rise in tax revenues and fall in transfers.
28. An interesting result is the apparent strong substitutabili y between
securities in the third and fourth maturity classes. This result
appears even more strongly in the second simulation, reported in
columns(4) and(5).
29.See Friedman[14]for a discussion of this proposal. The general result
that quantitative actions to alter the supply-demand balance in the
credit market have a disproportionate effect on capital formation
also holds for the case of shifts in saving flows, analyzed in Friedman [15].
30. The public's shift from demand deposits to currency, within a fixed
Ml total, is the conventional result associated with greater real in-
come and higher short—term interest rates. The small increase in
borrowed reserves occurs mostly because the simulation holds the discount
rate fixed despite the rise in short—term market rates.
31. The reduction of the deficit is surprisingly large for the associated
increase in income, even after allowance for the difference between
nominal and real magnitudes.(The CNP deflator's historical average
during this period was 130.3.)
32. The difference is $4.22 billion instead of $4.0 billion (4 quarters
times $1.0 billion per quarter) because of the smaller total volume of
Treasury financing due to the induced rise in tax revenues and fall in
transfers.By the end of the simulation period the outstanding amount
is $5.19 billion less than the historical.
33. See again foothote 30.
34. See Friedman [9 1fora discussion of the rationale underlying the role
offinancial flow variables in interestrate determination in the short
run.In the long run, only the stocks matter.Re ferences
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